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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

REBECCA JANE CHADWICK,
PlaintiffAppellant,
-vs-

Case No. 20732

TALMAGE NIELSEN, M. D.,
DefendantRespondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, DISTRICT JUDGE

ISSUES FOR REVIEW
This is a medical malpractice action in which the trial
court, Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, directed a verdict for
defendant at the close of plaintiff's evidence in accordance with
Rule 50(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Whether the directed

verdict was appropriate is now before this Court. That determination
requires consideration of five issues:
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1.

Did plaintiff establish a prima facie case of

medical negligence?
2.

Did plaintiff establish a prima facie case of lack

of informed consent?
3.

Did plaintiff establish a prima facie case for

recovery under any other theory of relief?
4.

Is plaintiff's action barred as a matter of law by

the applicable statute of repose?
5.

Was there any other reversible error committed by

the trial court?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
!•

PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is a medical malpractice action against a Salt
Lake vascular surgeon, Dr. Talmage Nielsen. Dr. Nielsen performed
varicose vein surgery on Rebecca Chadwick's left leg at L.D.S.
Hospital in Salt Lake City on September 19, 1979.

Ms. Chadwick

alleges that the decision to perform the surgery was inappropriate,
that she was not informed of the risks of the surgery, that she
was assured of a good result from the surgery, that Dr. Nielsen's
postoperative care was negligent and, finally, that Dr. Nielsen
intentionally withheld the results of a preoperative vein test
from her.

(See, Complaint, R.2 and Amended Complaint, R.79.)
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As

a result of the surgery plaintiff alleges she suffered a four-year
period of disability caused by swelling and pain in her left leg.
(See, generally, Ms. Chadwick's trial testimony at R.467 to
495.).
The Complaint was filed on May 4, 1984. Partial summary
judgment was entered on the "oral warranty" claims on September
19, 1984. A non-jury trial solely on the issue of the statute of
repose was held in accordance with § 78-12-47, Utah Code Ann.
(1953, as amended)^/ on March 26, 1985, the court denying judgment
for defendant on the grounds that the "continuing negligence"
doctrine created a fact issue which might only be decided after a
trial on the merits (The transcript of the limitations trial is
at R.242-342; the court's decision is at R.97.)
Plaintiff thereafter moved to amend her Complaint to
allege an "intentional concealment" by Dr. Nielsen of the results
of the preoperative vein test, to set aside the partial summary
judgment, and to continue the trial date.

(R.73-95).

All of

plaintiff's motions were heard and denied on the morning of the
first day of the trial on the merits, April 16, 1985. (R.346-358).

1/

All statutory citations are to the Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended).
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At the close of plaintifffs evidence, the trial court
granted Dr. Nielsen's motion for a directed verdict on the grounds
that plaintiff had produced no expert testimony of negligence or
causation and, thus, had failed to establish a prima facie case
on any of her claims for relief.

Additionally, the court ruled

that the claims were barred by the applicable four-year statute
of repose, § 78-14-4 (R.545-551, 234). This appeal followed.
II.
RELEVANT FACTS
This appeal stems from an attempt to oversimplify
complex issues of vascular surgery and to impose medical liability
on a physician without the benefit of expert testimony.
apparent theory of plaintiff's case —
evidence —

The

unsupported by any medical

was that the symptoms she claims to have developed

postoperatively were due to Dr. Nielsen's removing a surface vein
in her left leg when the only other source of circulation in that
leg — the deep vein — wasn't working. (See, generally, Appellant's
Brief at 1-5.)
claims.

That allegation is premised upon two liability

First, that Dr. Nielsen ignored a preoperative test

which showed that the deep system was inadequate and, thus, that
the surgery was inappropriate; and, second, that Dr. Nielsen
concealed this material information from plaintiff and, in fact,
guaranteed that he would not perform this surgery unless the
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condition of the deep venous system would allow it.

Analysis of

the medical issues shows these claims to be flawed.
On September 19, 1979, Dr. Nielsen performed a left
standard saphenous phlebectomy on plaintiff; that is, he removed
one of the larger surface veins on the inside of her left leg
from just below the knee to just above the ankle.

The reason for

performing the surgery was that the saphenous vein was incompetent,
(having valves which were not working) and thus was unable to
perform its function of transporting blood back to the heart.
That incompetency can cause damage to the venous system because
it results in a standing pool of blood under considerable hydrostatic
tension in the vein.

(See, generally, R.425 ff)

That tension

produces swelling and large, ugly varicose veins which result
from the blood invading the surrounding tissue.

(R.428)

By

removing the varicose vein, Dr. Nielsen was intending to prevent
more serious difficulties such as ulcerations, pigmentation,
brawny edema, or other problems due to the varicosity.

(R.428-429)

Without the benefit of any expert testimony, plaintiff
relied upon her interpretation of two documents to support her
claims: a September 14, 1979, report on a phleborheogram performed
at Dr. Nielsen's request on plaintiff's legs and a letter of the
same date from Dr. Nielsen to Dr. Jonathan Daines, plaintiff's
referring physician and uncle.
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The phleborheogram ("PRG") is a pulse-pressure test and
a respiratory wave test.

(R.396)

A respiratory wave is created

when we breathe and expand our chest wall causing a negative
pressure that draws blood into the chest and then into the heart.
(Id.)

If veins are open, a respiratory wave will be transmitted

all the way down the veins.

(Id.)

If a vein is not open, then

the respiratory wave will not be transmitted.

If a vein is not

quite normal, then there will be a "dampening" of the respiratory
wave.

(Id.)
The PRG is performed by a technician and produces both

a study tracing and a report, much like an x-ray produces both a
typed report and an actual film study.

(R.374)

Dr. Nielsen

based his decisions concerning the treatment of plaintiff's
condition not only upon the report, but also upon a discussion of
the tracings with the technician. (R.374) The PRG report indicated
an abnormality in the left leg: "Although there is reasonably
good transmission of respiratory waves on the left, there is
persistent elevation of the baseline waves with distal pressure,
this suggests a chronic obstructive situation."

(A copy of the

PRG report is in Appellant's Brief at Appendix A-I.)
An "obstruction" means any degree of interference with
normal flow, however minimal.

An "occlusion" means that the vein

is shut off completely and that there are no detour channels.
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(R.372-373)

After reviewing the tracings and the report with the

technician, Dr. Nielsen's medical opinion was that the PRG results
were very encouraging and showed good respiratory wave transmission
throughout the leg, with only minor interference with the flow in
the deep system.

(R.371-372)

That minor interference was due to

plaintiff's childhood knee surgery.

(R.397)

In Dr. Nielsen's

opinion, plaintiff's surface vein problem could be corrected with
standard varicose surgery without the necessity of a more extensive
procedure.
There is repetitive discussion of this point throughout
Dr. Nielsen's testimony.

(See, for example, R.367-375, 391-397)

Plaintiff attempts to construe the PRG report as containing
information which would contradict varicose vein surgery or
increase the risk of complications from it.

Neither of these

assertions was supported by any medical evidence at trial and, in
fact, both assertions were shown to be false by Dr. Nielsen's
testimony.

In essence, plaintiff's theory is that the inner vein

was "unequivocally and abnormally obstructed" (R.370) based on
the PRG report, although the PRG report says nothing of the sort,
and, further, that an "obstruction" must mean a contraindication
to the surgery.

However, the only medical evidence is that

plaintiff's obstruction was of a very minor nature and posed no
contraindication or increased risk from the varicose vein surgery.
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Plaintiff, in recognition of her lack of any expert testimony,
attempts to avoid the necessity of producing a medical opinion by
characterizing the PRG report as containing "material" information
which was "concealed" from her, even though the only medical
evidence was that the information was not "material" and was, in
fact, encouraging.

(R.367-365, 391-397)

As an alternative position, plaintiff attempts to
characterize Dr. Nielsen's preoperative letter to Dr. Jonathan
Daines as a written guarantee that he would not perform varicose
vein surgery unless the deep system was normal.
letter is Appendix II to Appellant's Erief.)

(A copy of the

In this letter, Dr.

Nielsen tells Dr. Daines of the results of his examination and
indicates that a phleborheogram would be performed to be certain
that there was no obstruction that would contraindicate the
surgery:

"However, to be certain that there is no obstruction, a

phleborheogram will be obtained tomorrow.

If this is normal, I

would think that she can be given complete relief by just a
standard saphenous phlebectomy on this side. That will be planned
if the deep system is normal as anticipated."
The uncontradicted

testimony of the author of the

letter, Dr. Nielsen, is that the letter means just what it says:
that plaintiff could be given complete relief by just a standard
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saphenous phlebectomy if there were no obstruction.

If there

were an obstruction, a more extensive surgery would become necessary.
(R.375)

That is, if there was only a problem with the surface

system, only the surface system would need surgery.

If there was

also a problem with the deep system, then something in addition,
such as ligating the communicating veins, would also be necessary.
(R.385)
Fortunately, the PRG report showed that the obstruction
was very minor and that there was no problem with the valves and
that, therefore, more extensive surgery would not be necessary.
It was never intended that the surgery would not be performed if
the PRG showed a problem with the deep system, only that a more
extensive surgery in addition to the standard varicose vein
surgery would be necessary.

(R.385, 424)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff failed to establish a medical negligence
case, since she produced no competent evidence of the standard of
care, its breach, or that any breach proximately caused her alleged
injuries.

She also failed to establish an informed consent case,

since she neglgected to prove that any risk which may have been
undisclosed to her was a "substantial and significant" risk of
the surgery.

Nor did she establish a cause of action under any
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other theory of relief, including breach of warranty or concealment
of material information by Dr. Nielsen.
Even had plaintiff established a cause of action, her
claim is necessarily barred by the four-year medical malpractice
statute of repose.

Finally, there was no other reversible error

committed by the trial court, either in denying plaintiff's
pretrial motion to amend, in limiting the cross-examination of
Dr. Nielsen, or in refusing to allow plaintiff's father, an
electrical engineer, to testify as an expert witness against Dr.
Nielsen.
ARGDMENT
I.
NO MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASE WAS ESTABLISHED
A*

Elements of the prima facie case.

The elements of a prima facie medical negligence case
are three: first, the medical standard of care must be established;
second, the defendant must be shown to have breached that standard
of care; third, that the breach must be shown to have proximately
caused an injury to the plaintiff.

Schmidt v. Intermountain

Health Care, Inc. , 635 P.2d 99,101 (Utah 1981); Nixdorf v. Hicken,
612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980).
these elements.
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Plaintiff established none of

B.

There was no evidence of the standard of care nor
of its breach.
1.

The standard and its breach must be established
through expert testimony.

The standard of care and its breach must ordinarily be
established by expert medical testimony.

Jennings v. Stoker, 652

P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1982); Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604
P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 1979).

Although declining to do so at trial

(R.544), plaintiff now contends that the propriety of the treatment
she received is within the common knowledge and experience of laymen:
"Laymen understand that you do not remove a functional surface
vein system in a leg when the only other principal inner vein
system for blood removal is obstructed." (Appellant's Brief at 15-16)
This Court has recognized the "common knowledge" exception
to the requirement of expert medical testimony.

See, for example,

Nixdorf v. Hicken, supra (surgical needle left in operative
site); Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980) (drill bit
dropped down patient's throat); and Talbot v. Dr. W. G. Groves
Latter-Day Saints Hospital, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872
(1968).

However, a required foundational element for the use of

the doctrine is that the injury is, to common knowledge, of a
kind which in the ordinary course of events would not have happened
absent negligence.

Nixdorf v. Hicken at 352-3; Ballow v. Monroe,

699 P.2d 719, 721 (Utah 1985).

In a medical case, this means that
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the outcome must so affront general concepts of medical propriety
that no expert is needed,

Nixdorf v. Hicken at 353.

The complexities of the issues are evident upon the briefest
scanning of Dr. Nielsen's testimony. Further, the only medical
evidence is that Dr. Nielsen removed an incompetent surface vein
and left a competent deep vein, (See, for example, R.388-389), and
that minor obstruction of the deep vein was not a contraindication
to surgery on the surface vein. (R.385)

The complexities of

vascular surgery do not readily admit to oversimplification by
untrained laypersons, as the continuing efforts of Dr. Nielsen to
make himself understood to plaintiff's counsel demonstrate.
(See, R.388-393, 396-397, 419-424)
2.

No expert testimony was produced by plaintiff.

Although plaintiff attempted to qualify her father, an
electrical engineer, as an expert witness to testify against Dr.
Nielsen (See, V(C), below), she produced no medical witness to
support either her negligence or causation allegations. Recognizing
this, she contends that adverse testimony from Dr. Nielsen in
accordance with Jennings v. Stoker, supra, established the standard
of care, its breach, and causation.

(Appellant's Brief at 16-17)

However, plaintiff points to no specific evidence in the record
wherein the standard of care, its breach, or causation was
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established.

Indeed, the only medical evidence on record from

Dr. Nielsen was that the surgery was appropriate.
C.

There was no evidence that any breach of the
standard of care proximately caused plaintiff's
injuries*

Medical causation is a complex area generally requiring
expert testimony to establish that a plaintiff's injuries were
proximately caused by the health care in question. Nixdorf v. Hicken,
supra, at 354, n.17 (expert proof on causation required even in res
ipsa loquitur cases); Penney v. St. Mark's Hospital, 21 Utah 2d
189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968) and see, Anderton v. Montgomery, 607
P. 2d 828, 834 (res ipsa foundation does not relieve plaintiff
of burden of proving causation).
No expert testimony established that plaintiff's alleged
injuries were due to the surgery performed by defendant.

In

fact, the only competent medical evidence was Dr. Nielsen's
testimony, which established that plaintiff was better off after
the surgery because she had been relieved of the potential risks
of an untreated incompetent vein.

He also testified that her

alleged postoperative injuries might have occurred regardless of
the surgery. (R.428-429) Her claimed problems could not be assumed
to have been caused by the surgery.

(R.397, 405)

contradictory evidence from any other witness.
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There was no

II.
NO INFORMED CONSENT CASE WAS ESTABLISHED
A.

Elements of the prima facie case.

The elements of an informed consent case are statutory
and governed by § 78-14-5. They are:
1.

That a provider-patient relationship existed;

2.

That the provider rendered health care to the

3.

That the plaintiff suffered personal

plaintiff;
injuries

arising out of the health care rendered;
4.

That the health care rendered carried with it a

substantial and significant risk of causing the plaintiff serious
harm;
5.

That the plaintiff was not, in fact, informed of

the substantial and significant risk;
6.

That a reasonable person in plaintiff's position

would not have consented to the surgery if told of the risk; and
7.

That the unauthorized part of the health care

rendered was a proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff; that
is, that the substantial and significant risk actually occurred.
To make out a prima facie informed consent case, plaintiff
must prove all of the statutory elements.
711 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah 1985).

Burton v. Youngblood,

That proof is lacking.

- 15 -

B.

The prima facie elements were not established.

Consideration of the prima facie elements of an informed
consent case in view of the evidence presented by plaintiff
demonstrates the deficiencies in her proof.
Elements 1 (provider relationship) and 2 (health care
rendered) were undisputed and established.

Element 3 (proximate

causation of injuries) was not established by any competent
medical evidence. (See, 1(C), above) No expert testimony established
that plaintiff's alleged injuries were due to the surgery performed
by Dr. Nielsen.

(R.428-429)

Failure to prove causation in an

informed consent case is fatal.

Burton v. Youngblood, Id.

There was no evidence to establish Element 4; that is,
what were the "substantial and significant" risks of "serious harm"
from the varicose vein procedure.

Although expert testimony

is not necessary to establish whether a doctor should have disclosed
a material risk, expert testimony is required to establish what
those material risks might be.

Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d

772, 791-92 (D. C. Cir. 1972) ("Experts are ordinarily indispensable
to identify and elucidate . . . the risks of therapy . . . . " ) ;
Beauvais v. Notre Dame Hospital, 387 A.2d 689, 692 (R.I. 1978);
Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 563 (D. C. Cir. 1982) ("Although
expert testimony is not needed to establish the scope of or the breach
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of the duty to inform one's patients before treating them, we
note that expert testimony is necessary to establish the nature
and degree of the risks of the proposed and alternate treatments,
the probability of therapeutic success, and whether disclosure
would be detrimental to a particular patient."); Sard v. Hardy,
379 A.2d 1014, 1024 (Md. 1977) ("We are not to be understood as
holding, however, that expert medical testimony can be dispensed
with entirely in cases of informed consent. Such expert testimony
would be required to establish the nature of the risks inherent
in a particular treatment . . . .") ; and Getchell v. Mansfield,
489 P.2d 953, 956 (Ore. 1971).
Malpractice:

See, also, Seidelson, Medical

Informed Consent Cases in "Full Disclosure"

Jurisdictions, 14 Duq. L. Rev. 309 (1976) (wherein the author
notes that generally only a duly-qualified expert medical witness
can identify material risks and that the "full disclosure" rule
does not eliminate the need for expert medical testimony.)
The only testimony —

expert or otherwise -- in this

record on any substantial and significant risk in Dr. Nielsen's
surgery was the testimony of Dr. Nielsen, who stated that the
only "major risk" of the surgery was blood clotting (thrombosis)
in the deep vein system.

(R.383-4)

No witness identified the

postoperative problems plaintiff alleges she suffered to be a known
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risk of the procedure, let alone a "substantial and significant"
risk of it. Without such testimony, it is inappropriate to assume
that plaintiff's problems were a substantial and significant
risk of the surgery.

Plaintiff presented no evidence of the

materiality of any risk other than the risk of deep vein blood
clots, which risk did not occur.
Element 5 (plaintiff not informed of a risk) was the
subject of disputed evidence, but plaintiff did make a sufficient
showing by testifying that she was not informed of any risks
preoperatively.

However, that alone is insufficient unless

competent testimony establishes that she was not informed of a
substantial and significant risk.

Similarly, Element 6 (that a

reasonable person would not have consented) was sufficiently
established, if we assume that plaintiff established an undisclosed
and material risk.
Finally, Element 7 (that the unauthorized health care
caused the plaintiff's injury) is essentially the same as Element
3.

Suffice it to say that even if there were evidence that

plaintiff's injuries were caused by the surgery, there was no
evidence that those injuries were the result of an undisclosed
substantial and significant risk of the surgery.
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III.
PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED NO PRIMA FACIE CASE
UNDER ANY OTHER THEORY OF RELIEF
A.

No "written guarantee" was established.

The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act restricts breach
of contract and breach of warranty claims against physicians.

It

provides in § 78-14-6 that:
No liability shall be imposed upon any health
care provider on the basis of an alleged
breach of guaranty, warranty, contract or
assurance of results to be obtained from any
health care rendered unless the guaranty,
warranty, contract or assurance is set forth
in writing and signed by the health care
provider or an authorized agent of the provider.
Plaintiff relies on the September 14, 1979, letter from
Dr. Nielsen to Dr. Daines to establish a written warranty in
accordance with the statutory requirement. As previously discussed,
plaintiff contends that this letter warrants that Dr. Nielsen
would not perform the saphenous vein removal unless the deep
system was normal.

However, Dr. Nielsen testified that the

letter he wrote means what it says: that the saphenous surgery
alone would be performed if the deep system was normal.
it implies, something further would be required.

If not,

There is no

"warranty" to plaintiff that no surgery would be performed if the
deep vein system was inadequate.
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Plaintiff's "Second of Cause of Action" in her Complaint
originally alleged that defendant "assured" and "guaranteed" her
that there were no risks associated with the contemplated surgery
and that, relying on these assurances and guarantees, she consented
to undergo the surgery.

(R.2)

In his Answer to the Complaint,

defendant raised § 78-14-6 as an affirmative defense.

(R.7)

Defendant served requests for admissions on plaintiff in accordance
with Rule 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requests were
duly answered on June 29, 1984.

(R.18)

In her responses to

defendant's requests for admissions, plaintiff admitted that the
alleged assurances, representations, and guarantees were not set
forth in any writing.

(R.18)

Accordingly, defendant moved for

partial summary judgment in view of these admissions and the
requirements of § 78-14-6.

(R.20)

After a hearing at which

counsel for plaintiff did not appear, Judge Frederick entered
partial summary judgment for defendant, dismissing the Second
Cause of Action with prejudice.

(R.36)

Plaintiff, two weeks

before trial on the merits, moved to set aside the partial summary
judgment and to amend the Complaint to allege a written warranty,
based on her "discovery" of the September 14, 1979 letter at the
trial on the statute of limitations.

(R.83, 92, 94)

The court

denied the motion to amend on the grounds that it was not made
with due diligence and that, as a matter of law, the September
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14, 1979 letter did not set forth a written warranty in accordance
with the statute.
Plaintiff never moved to set aside her admission that
the warranty she alleged was not set forth in any writing. Rule
36(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
Any matter admitted under this rule is
conclusively established unless the court on
motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the
admission. . . [T] he court may permit withdrawal
or amendment when the presentation of the
merits will be subserved thereby and the
party who obtains the admission fails to
satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment
will prejudice him in maintaining his action
on defense on the merits . . . ."
No such motion to withdraw or amend her admission was
ever made by plaintiff, despite counsel for defendant's indication
that this would be necessary.

(R.354 and see, further, R.77-98

and R.348-353)
This Court has consistently held that Rule 36(b) means
that matters deemed admitted are conclusively established unless
the trial court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the
admissions.

Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 98,

100 (Utah 1985); Whitaker v. Nichols, 699 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah
1985); Schmidt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1979); W. W.
& W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734,
736 (Utah 1977).
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Mere filing of a motion under Rule 60(b) to set aside a
judgment based upon admissions does not in itself set aside the
admissions: "Those matters are covered exclusively by a motion
made as provided by Rule 36(b)".
687.

Whitaker v. Nichols, supra at

As in Whitaker v. Nichols and in Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge,

there is nothing in this record to indicate that plaintiff moved
to amend or withdraw her admissions.

Therefore, the lack of a

written warranty as required by § 78-14-6 was conclusively established
under Rule 36(b) and was properly treated as such by the trial court.
B,

No "concealment* case was established.

Plaintiff contends that Dr. Nielsen had a duty to
disclose to her the results of the PRG, that he did not do so and
that, in fact, he fraudulently concealed those results. (Appellant's
Brief at 7-15).

Specifically, plaintiff contends that Dr. Nielsen

fraudulently concealed the results of the PRG by telling her that
the results were encouraging and by telling Dr. Daines that the
test showed "dampening of the pulse wave . . . but no luminal
occlusion." (Appellant's Brief at 11) This, according to plaintiff,
is obviously false because a "dictionary definition" (which
dictionary is not specified) shows that "occlusion," "obstruction,"
and "thrombosis" are essentially equivalent terms.

(Id.)

This demonstrates profound ignorance of the medical
facts.

As Dr. Nielsen patiently attempted to explain under
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cross-examination, an "occlusion" and an "obstruction" are not
synonomous. An obstruction is any interference with flow, however
minor, while an occlusion is a far more serious condition resulting
in a cessation of flow. (R.372, 423) On the other hand, "thrombosis"
is a different process producing blood clots, having nothing to
do with an occlusion or obstruction of the flow in the vessel,
(See, R.383-384)

To say that an occlusion, an obstruction, and a

thrombosis are synonyms demonstrates the pitfalls of non-learned
forays into a complex and learned field.
evidence of an occlusion.

There was never any

A minor obstructive situation, posing

no real threat to plaintiff, was diagnosed.

And, fortunately,

she never developed deep vein thrombosis.
In Nixdorf v. Hicken, supra, this court recognized the
fiduciary duty of a doctor to inform his patient of any material
information concerning the patient's physical condition.

The

Court held that it was a matter of common knowledge that surgical
needles are not left in a patient's body absent negligence and
that this was obviously a material piece of information which the
doctor should have disclosed to his patient.
That decision arose in the context of a postoperative
choice by the defendant doctor not to disclose an obviously
material piece of information to his patient.

This case is

not analogous. Plaintiff confuses the Nixdorf elements with informed
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consent.

In substance, her claim is that the PRG report contained

material information indicating an increased risk from the proposed
surgery and that, had she known of this risk, she would not have
undergone the procedure. Having been unable to prove the statutory
elements of an informed consent case, she nevertheless attempts
to construct a theory of relief under the Nixdorf doctrine.
The materiality of the withheld information in Nixdorf
was obvious to the appellate court.

This plaintiff assumes that

any information "withheld" from a plaintiff must be material.
There was no doubt in Nixdorf that a reasonable person in the
position of plaintiff would have considered the information
important in choosing a course of treatment.

However, in this

case, it is clear that plaintiff has little understanding of the
PRG report and can hardly claim it to be material.

The essence

of her argument is that the results of any preoperative diagnostic
test must be disclosed verbatim to a patient in order that that
patient, lacking any medical knowledge, can consider whether or
not the information is material, although the plaintiff may not
comprehend the information at all. The only medical evidence was
that the PRG report contained encouraging news and that nothing
in it contraindicated the proposed surgery.

Plaintiff certainly

has the right to disclosure of material information; however, she
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has no right to make uninformed speculations as to what specialized
tests mean and expect a physician to be bound by her determinations.
IV.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED IN ANY EVENT
BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF REPOSE
Section 78-14-4 provides the statute of limitations and
of repose for medical malpractice actions:
No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is commenced
within two years after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not
to exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence
. • . (our emphasis)
This action was commenced with the filing of the Complaint
on May 4, 1984.

(R.2)

September 19, 1979.

The date of the surgery in issue was
This Court has previously recognized the

"continuing negligence" doctrine, in Petelar v. Robison, 81 Utah
535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932), although the case was decided well
before the medical malpractice repose statute was enacted in
1976. That doctrine postulates that if continuing acts of negligence
of a similar character together lead to the injuries alleged, the
plaintiff should not be required to split a cause of action so
that those acts outside the repose period are barred, while those
within the repose period are not.
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It should be distinguished from two related doctrines,
the "continuing treatment doctrine", which holds that an action
accrues on the date of the last treatment, negligent or not, and
the "termination of relationship doctrine" which holds that an
action accrues on the termination of the physician-patient
relationship, whether or not treatment had continued.

Utah has

never recognized either of those related doctrines, and it is
doubtful that this Court would do so now in view of the express
language of the repose statute that an action accrues upon the
date of the negligent act or omission.
However, where the continuing negligence doctrine
is applied, a defendant is entitled to prove that there was, in
fact, no "negligent act" within the repose period.

For purposes

of the limitations issue the date of the last "negligent" conduct
by defendant is critical.

For example, if Dr. Nielsen had been

negligent in the surgery, and not negligent thereafter, this
action would be barred, since any negligent act would necessarily
be outside the four-year repose period.

See, Tamminnen v. Aetna

Casualty & Surety Co., 327 N.W.2d 55, 66 (Wis. 1978).

If plaintiff

failed to produce evidence that there was a negligent act or
omission after January 4, 1980, that is, within the four-year
repose period (plus the additional 90 days granted by service of
a notice of intent under § 78-14-8) her action must fail, even if
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t h e r e was sufficient evidence of negligence at any time before
that date.
As noted, plaintiff failed to produce any competent
evidence of any act of negligence, either before or after January
4, 1980.

Necessarily, therefore, defendant established his

affirmative defense that the action was barred by the applicable
statute of repose since no negligent act was shown to have occurred
within four years of the date of the commencement of the action.
V.
THERE WAS NO OTHER REVERSIBLE ERROR
COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL CODRT
Plaintiff contends that the trial court committed reversible
error (a) in denying her motion to amend her Complaint to add
causes of action for breach of warranty and intentional concealment,
(b) in restricting cross-examination of Dr. Nielsen; and (c) in
refusing to allow her father to testify as an expert witness.
None of these contentions has any merit.
A.

The motion to amend.

On February 5, 1985, defendant certified this matter as
ready for trial.

(R.39)

No objection was filed by plaintiff.

On February 28, 1985, this matter was set for jury trial on the
merits for April 9, 1985.

(R.44)

This date was later continued

at the request of counsel for defendant until April 16, 1985.
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(R.45, 47)

On April 2, 1984, following the non-jury trial on the

limitations issue, plaintiff moved to amend her Complaint to
allege the existence of a written guarantee in accordance with
§ 78-14-6 and to allege an actionable concealment on the part of
Dr. Nielsen.

(R.92, 83)

At the same time, plaintiff moved for

relief from the partial summary judgment entered on the written
guarantee issue.

(R.94, 87) Finally, plaintiff moved to continue

the scheduled trial date or, in the alternative, for a Rule 54(b)
certification on the statute of limitations question.

(R.87, 77)

The motions were heard on the morning of the first day
of trial on the merits, April 16, 1984. (R.346) All of plaintiff's
motions were denied by the trial court.

(R.356-358)

The motion

to amend to allege a written guarantee was denied on the grounds
of lack of due diligence and investigation by plaintiff's counsel
and that in any event, the September 14, 1979 letter could not be
construed as a written guarantee.

The motion to amend to allege

an actionable concealment was denied for similar reasons.
Plaintiff never took the deposition of defendant or of
any other witness.

Plaintiff never requested copies of Dr.

Nielsen's medical records, which contained the documents she now
contends show an intentional concealment and a written warranty.
No Interrogatories under Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
were ever served by plaintiff.
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No requests for admission of

facts were ever served by plaintiff.

In short, plaintiff did no

discovery of any kind prior to trial.
Motions to amend pleadings are, of course, liberally
granted under Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and every
final judgment should grant all relief to which a party is entitled,
even if not demanded in the pleadings.

Behrens v. Raleigh Hills

Hospital, Inc. , 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1983).

However, a

motion to amend remains within the sound discretion of the trial
court.

Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984),

Westley v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah
1983).

Where plaintiff failed to engage in any discovery of any

kind, denial of the motion to amend can hardly be construed to
constitute an abuse of discretion, especially since every document
which plaintiff contends is significant was readily discoverable
to her, had she wished to do so.
More significantly, the denial of plaintiff's motions
is, in fact, immaterial since plaintiff presented all the evidence
she wanted to present under the "concealment" and "warranty"
theories at trial.

She was even allowed to make arguments on

those issues in response to the motion for directed verdict.

The

directed verdict subsumed the new theories of relief and indicated
that plaintiff presented no prima facie case under those or any
other theories.

Thus, even if the denial of the motion to amend
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was erroneous, no harm resulted from it since no evidence was excluded
based upon it, and no reversible error can be premised upon it.
See, Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Loader v. Scott
Construction Co., 681 P.2d 1227, 1228 (Utah 1984).
B*

Cross-examination of Dr. Nielsen,

Plaintiff alleges that the trial court committed reversible
error in not allowing a complete cross-examination of Dr. Nielsen
on the issue of the PRG report: "The judge's sustaining spurious
objections to 'incriminating' questions on this key issue was not
only reversible error but may reflect the judge's reluctance to
preside over a trial involving evidence of aggrevated

(sic)

misconduct of a member of the esteemed medical profession."
(Appellant's Brief at 21)
The testimony in question is as follows:
Q.

(BY MR. DAINES)

Dr. Nielsen, I think you said that

you told Becky Chadwick

that the results of the

phleborheogram were basically good; is that right?
A.

(BY DR. NIELSEN)

Compared to what might have been,

yes.
Q.

(BY MR. DAINES)

Do you think that you had an obligation

to tell her that while you thought they were good, that
Dr. Ford, Dr. Swensen, and the technician, however,
were of the opinion that her deep system was chronically
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obstructed and that those were the results of the test
and the report from their point of view, whether you thought
they were good or not?
MR. HANSON:

Objection.

That's based upon facts not in

evidence.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

MR. DAINES:

Your

Honor, that's a good and fair

representation of what the phleborheogram report says.
THE COURT: Well Mr. Daines, it may be fairly representative
of what the report says, but it is not representative of
what the doctors felt that the effect or interpretation
of the report was."

(R.398-399)

The objections were not "spurious" nor the questions
"incriminating." As the court noted, there was no evidence on what
Dr. Ford, Dr. Swensen and the PRG technician thought of the PRG
report.

In fact, the PRG report itself merely "suggests" a

chronic obstructive situation and says nothing about the deep
system. The sustaining of this objection was entirely appropriate,
since the question contained misrepresentations of facts and
assumptions of facts not in evidence.
C.

Mr, Chadwick as an expert witness.

Plaintiff attempted to qualify her father, Mr. Duane G.
Chadwick, as an expert witness, apparently to establish the
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standard of care or causation of plaintiffs injuries. (R.481-497)
Mr. Chadwick is an electrical engineer and a professor of engineering
at Utah State University and, in plaintiff's view, was qualified
to testify as an expert witness on the significance of the
phleborheogram report because of his expertise in water flow
mechanics. (R.524-525) Defendant objected to any expert testimony
from this witness on the ground that he was not qualified under
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence.

(R.523-525)

Voir dire in aid of defendant's objection established
that Mr. Chadwick was not a medical doctor, had never measured
"flow parameters11 on the human body, had never studied medicine,
had never performed surgery, had never studied the human vascular
system, had never performed a phleborheogram, and had never
interpreted a phleborheogram.

(R.523-525) The trial court there-

upon sustained defendant's objection.

(R.525 and R.531-536)

Mr.

Chadwick was not allowed to express any expert opinions.
Burton v. Youngblood, supra, recognized the general
rule that a practitioner of one school of medicine is not competent
to testify as an expert in a medical malpractice action against a
practitioner of another school unless a foundation is laid that
the same standards govern both specialities.

711 P.2d at 248.

Implicit in this ruling is the recognition that an electrical
engineer is even less competent to testify against a medical
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specialist.

Nothing precludes consideration of expert testimony

from an individual in a trade different than that in issue when
the standard of care is identical for both.

The critical fact in

determining the competency of an expert is whether that expert
has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the
issues before it.

Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d

250, 253 (Utah 1985).

Foundational to that determination is a

showing that the proffered witness is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to express an
opinion on the subject at issue.

See, generally, J. B. Weinstein

and M. A. Berger, Weinstein1s Evidence, Par. 702 [01]-[04] (1985).
Mr. Chadwick, an electrical engineer, readily admitted
that he had no knowledge of vascular surgery or of medicine in
general. Lack of a medical degree may not in itself be an automatic
disqualification.

See, for example, Jenkins v. United States,

307 F.2d 637 (D. C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (A pre-Rule 702 case
considering the qualifications of non-M. D. psychologists to
render opinions on "mental diseases or defects" in criminal
cases.) However, at a minimum, an expert in a medical malpractice
case should be required to demonstrate some familiarity with medical
principles and with the applicable standard of care. This witness
denied any such knowledge.
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The determination of whether a proffered witness is
competent to testify as an expert is within the discretion of the
trial court.
Evidence.

Wessel, supra at 253; Rule 104(a), Utah Rules of

Its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless

clearly in error. Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services,
667 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1983); Shurtleff v. J. Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d
1168 (Utah 1980); and Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Freuhauf Corp.,
547 F.2d 1365, 1374 (8th Cir. 1977).

No such clear error exists

here.
Finally, it should be noted that Rule 103(a), Utah
Rules of Evidence, provides that: "Error may not be predicated
upon a ruling which . . . excludes evidence . . . unless . . .
the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by
offer or was apparent from the context within which questions
were asked."

A party's failure to make an offer of proof as to

excluded evidence precludes him from asserting on appeal that the
exclusion of his evidence was in error.

Downey State Bank v.

Major Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978); Dansak v.
Deluxe, 12 Utah 2d 302, 366 P.d 67 (1961) and cases cited therein;
and see, Andrews v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 334 F.2d 422,
424 (8th Cir. 1964) (Exclusion of witness at medical malpractice
trial.)
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An offer of proof must be certain, sufficient, and
intelligible and must definitely show the facts sought to be
proved.

It must show the materiality, competency, and relevance

of the evidence offered.
306; 366 P.2d at 70.

Dansak v. Deluxe, supra, 12 Utah 2d at

Plaintiff never made any offer of proof

as to what Mr. Chadwick would testify, let alone a sufficient
offer of proof under the rules of evidence.

Plaintiff did "offer

to prove" that a non-medical expert in fluid flows is as qualified
as a medical expert in blood flows, but left it at that. (R.492-493)
This is no mere technicality.

Reversible error is not to be

presumed, but must be shown on the record.
supra, 334 F.2d at 428.

Olin Mathieson,

The function of the offer of proof is to

inform the court what the excluded evidence would have proved and
ensures that the record will be sufficiently detailed to permit
appraisal by an appellate court of the effect of the ruling so
that it can determine whether the court committed
error.

reversible

Weinstein, supra, Par. 103[03].
There is nothing in this record to tell us what Mr.

Chadwick would have testified to had he been permitted to testify.
We cannot know whether he would have testified that Dr. Nielsen's
surgery was negligent, or whether the phleborheogram showed a
contraindication to the surgery, or whether the surgery caused
plaintiff's postoperative disability.
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Since there is no evidence

to show that the excluded evidence would have been material and
significant, there is no basis to premise reversible error on its
exclusion.

See, Yost v. A. 0. Smith, Corp. f 562 F.2d 592, 595

(9th Cir. 1977).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, defendant, Talmage Nielsen, M.

D.,

respectfully submits that the decision of the lower court entering
a directed verdict in his favor should be affirmed.

DATED this 18th day of April, 1986.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent

Stewart M. Hanson,*<rr ., Esq.
Francis J. Carney, Esq.
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